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INDUSTRIALIZED SOURCE NATION'S DIFFICULTIES IN
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1. INTRODUCrION
Under the cover of night, tombaroli search the Italian country-
side for ancient tombs and burial chambers.' The precious Greek
and Etruscan artifacts they find in these sites fetch high prices on
the illicit antiquities market.2 Motivated by the steady income
from sales of antiquities to middlemen and local Italian buyers, the
tombaroli continue looting despite its illegality.3 The middlemen, in
contrast, enjoy big profits that make the risk of illegal trade
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1 Tombaroli are tomb raiders, who loot both tombs that they discover and offi-
cial archaeological sites. See Giovanni Lattanzi, Tales of a Tombarolo,
ARCHAEOLOGY, May-June 1998, at 48, 49 ("A: How do you search for tombs? T: I
know the land, know how to recognize the kind of grass that grows on the ground
[above tombs], know almost what the ancient Etruscans were thinking when they
were looking for places to bury their dead."); Andrew L. Slayman, Italy Fights
Back, ARCHAEOLOGY, May-June 1998, at 43 ("The tombaroli's job is made easier by
the large number of unidentified and unguarded sites, but looters are equally at
home raiding protected areas .... [C]landestine digging at Morgantina [in Sicily]
was almost uncontrolled; [archaeologists] were having to guard [their] own
trenches at night and actually suffered some losses.").
2 See Slayman, supra note 1 (noting that artifacts found in tombs and burial
sites can be sold illegally for large profits).
3 See Cristina Ruiz, My Life as a Tombarolo, at http://www.theartnewspaper
.com/news/article.asp?idart=4890.
It makes me sad that our heritage, our Italian history is disappearing like
this. I'd like to have an honest job, to spend my nights in bed with my
wife,' says Mr. Induno [the tombarolo interviewed in the article], 'but
there's no alternative for me or for my men. We work to put food on the
table for our families. I know I'm stealing from the State, but I don't
know anyone who does this job who is rich. We are all unemployed, we
do what we have to do.
Published by Penn Law: Legal Scholarship Repository, 2014
U. Pa. J. Int'l Econ. L.
worthwhile. 4 The demand for antiquities and monetary incentives
allow the trade to flourish, making Italy a major supplier of ancient
artifacts.
Sadly, in result, Italy has suffered numerous losses of its cul-
tural heritage and destruction of its ancient past.5 Tombaroli work
hastily and crudely, and, in the process, cause devastating harm to
the sites.6 To make matters worse, tombaroli often destroy unprof-
itable artifacts and archaeological data such as human bones. 7 The
hasty, crude removal damages the sites and leaves the artifacts in
poor condition. 8 "Each time an antiquity is discovered and re-
moved from a site without first being studied by anthropologists,
the historical record that can be constructed through scientific
evaluation of the piece in situ is destroyed." 9 The antiquity, re-
moved from its site without proper evaluation, becomes nothing
4 See id.
(The guy I work with the most is a professional [states Mr. Induno] ....
He makes a very good living from selling the material he buys from me
and from other tombaroli. I estimate that this guy sells the stuff for 10
times what he paid me. Let me put it this way: he drives a Mercedes, I
drive a Fiat Panda.);
see also Neil Brodie, Pity the Poor Middlemen, CULTURE WITHOT CONTEXT (Illicit
Antiquities Research Center, Cambridge, U.K.), Aug. 1998 (providing a table
which shows that more than 98% of the final market price goes to the middle-
men), available at http://www.mcdonald.cam.ac.uk/IARC/cwoc/issue3
/Midman.htm.
5 See PAUL M. BATOR, THE INTERNATIONAL TRADE IN ART 2 (U. Chicago Press
1988) (1982) ("Complaints from classical archaeologists about the looting of sites
in the Mediterranean region are an old story."); Jonathan S. Moore, Note, Enforc-
ing Foreign Ownership Claims in the Antiquities Market, 97 YALE L.J. 466, 466 (1988)
("[T]he lucrative trade in stolen antiquities fuels the destruction of ancient civili-
zations' archaeological records."); Caveat Emptor, ECONOMIST, Sept. 18, 1999, LEXIS,
Nexis Library, The Economist File (identifying Italy and Turkey as countries
"where archaeological sites are commonly looted").
6 Slayman, supra note 1, at 43 (noting that tombaroli often destroy the sites
from which they steal artifacts).
7 See id.; see also Patty Gerstenblith, The Public Interest in the Restitution of Cul-
tural Objects, 16 CONN. J. INT'L L. 197, 206 (2001) (stating that tomb robbers and site
looters often destroy objects "either in order to make them transportable or simply
out of ignorance").
8 Michael J. Kelly, Conflicting Trends in the Flourishing International Trade of Art
and Antiquities: Restitutio in Integrum and Possessio Animo Ferundi/Lucrandi, 14 DICK.
J. INT'L L. 31, 33 (1995).
9 Moore, supra note 5, at 466; see BATOR, supra note 5, at 25 ("The preservation
of archaeological evidence thus requires not only... [protection from] destruction
or mutilation but, further, an opportunity to study and record exactly where and
how each object was buried and how it related to other objects.").
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more than a decorative or aesthetic item with little or no historical
significance. 10 Even if the item is recovered, the loss of history
cannot be.
1.1. Source Nations" Tend to Be Developing Nations
The antiquities and cultural artifacts sold on the black market
often originate from source nations that are developing nations.
12
Some advocates of nationalist protection of cultural property,
13
10 See BATOR, supra note 5, at 25 ("An antiquity without a provenance -even
if perfectly preserved-is of limited historical significance; if we do not know
where it came from, it can provide only limited scientific knowledge of the past.").
11 "Source nation" refers to a nation that possesses large reserves of cultural
property. Other terms used to describe such a nation include art-rich nation, arti-
fact-rich nation, nations of origin, and supply nations. Appropriately, market na-
tion refers to a nation that creates the demand for cultural property because of its
small or nonexistent reserves. Similar terms are art-poor nation, demand nation,
artifact-poor nation, and purchaser nation. See Chauncey D. Steele IV, Note, The
Morgantina Treasure: Italy's Quest for Repatriation of Looted Artifacts, 23 SUFFOLK
TRANSNAT'L L. REv. 667, 676-77 (2000).
12 See JEANErrE GREENFIELD, THE RETURN OF CULTURAL TREASURES 185 (2d ed.
1996).
Because of the main direction in which such objects flowed ... [the re-
moval of property as a result of previous colonization and the continued
illicit traffic in art treasures] has inevitably become primarily an issue for
Third World countries, in opposition to the more developed countries,
and in particular for former colonial nations.
Id.; see also John Henry Merryman, Mhat Do Matisse, Van Gogh, and Hitler Have in
Common?, U.B.C. L. REv. 273, 274 (1994) ("[Many source nations, though rich in
cultural artifacts, have small gross domestic products and fragile economies.");
Kenneth Polk, The Antiquities Trade Viewed as a Criminal Market (stating that the
antiquities trade "is driven fundamentally by the economic demand originating in
wealth developed countries, which then exerts a pull on the supply often found in
underdeveloped nations"), at http://www.hk-lawyer.com/2000-9/SepOO-cover
.htm; Samuel Sidib6, Fighting Pillage: National Efforts and International Cooperation,
in ILLICIT TRAFFIC IN CULTURAL PROPERTY: MUSEUMS AGAINST PILLAGE 25, 25 (Harris
Leyten ed., 1995) ("Cultural resources of poor countries are exported to rich coun-
tries. There are no examples of the contrary.").
13 "Cultural property" refers to artifacts, antiquities, and works of art of ar-
chaeological, historical, and ethnological significance. See JOHN HENRY MERRYMAN,
Two Ways of Thinking About Cultural Property, in THINKING ABOUT THE ELGIN
IARBLES: CRMCAL ESSAYS ON CULTURAL PROPERTY, ART AND LAW 66 (2000) [herein-
after Two Ways of Thinking]. The United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cul-
tural Organization ("UNESCO") Convention on the Means of Prohibiting and
Preventing the Illicit Import, Export and Transfer of Ownership of Cultural Prop-
erty defines cultural property as "property which, on religious or secular grounds,
is specifically designated by each State as being of importance for archaeology,
prehistory, history, literature, art or science...." This definition is predicated on
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such as Jan Pronk, Dutch Minister for Development Cooperation in
1994, argue that the poverty in developing nations creates incen-
tives for the poor to steal and sell the artifacts to illicit traders at
low prices.' 4 Another popular claim is that developing nations lack
the resources to protect their cultural heritage and to recover lost
property. 15 Allegedly, developing nations lack the monetary funds
and administrative structure to enforce cultural property laws, pro-
tect existing national treasures, and reclaim stolen or illegally ex-
ported cultural objects. 16
the notion that cultural property is a part of a nation's cultural heritage, which is
preserved through export controls and the return or "repatriation" of stolen cul-
tural property, in contrast to the cultural internationalist conception of cultural
property as objects of a common human culture. Id. at 67-68. Here cultural prop-
erty will be used in the nationalist sense and solely in reference to antiquities.
14 See Jan Pronk, Fighting Poverty is Important for the Safeguarding of Cul-
tural Heritage, Speech in the Rijksmuseum voor Volkenkunde, Leiden, the Neth-
erlands (Feb. 18, 1994), in ILLICIT TRAFFIC IN CULTURAL PROPERTY: MUSEUMS
AGAINST PILLAGE 9, 10 (Harris Leyten ed., 1995) ("After all, if you were poor and
someone offered you a year's salary for every object you found, would you not
pick up a spade and start digging?"); see also Wir Bouwman, The International Art
Market, in ILLICIT TRAFFIC IN CULTURAL PROPERTY: MUSEUMS AGAINST PILLAGE 61, 61
(Harris Leyten ed., 1995) ("Due to underdevelopment ... [and] poverty ... coun-
tries such as Nepal, Tibet and Cambodia are culture-exporting countries .... In
South America, ancient ruins are being robbed of their contents by thousands of
poor people."); Slayman, supra note 1, at 43 ("The ... looting ... is due partly ...
to rural poverty aggravated by the scarcity of fertile land and shortage of jobs.")
15 See C. Franklin Sayre, Comment, Cultural Property Laws in India and Japan,
33 UCLA L. REV. 851, 857-58 (1986) (arguing that protection of cultural property
"ultimately depends on the socio-economic conditions that exist within each na-
tion and the political power of that nation in the international community," and
that developing nations like India lack resources and power); see also Lisa J.
Borodkin, Note, The Economics of Antiquities Looting and a Proposed Legal Alternative,
95 COLUM. L. REv. 377, 384 (1995). Contra James Ede, Ethics, the Antiquities Trade,
and Archaeology, 7 INT'L J. OF CULTURAL PROPERTY 128, 128 (1998) (stating that "less
money is available in artifact-rich nations, many of which are developing coun-
tries, for the conservation and security of national collections"); Moore, supra note
5, at 466 (claiming that "[a]rtifact-rich nations, the majority of which are develop-
ing nations, cannot protect their archaeological sites ... [because] these nations
lack the sophisticated customs services or police forces necessary to prevent loot-
ing"); Caveat Emptor, supra note 5 (stating that "Asian and African objects are less
expensive than European pieces-while also coming from countries which lack
the means to track them down"); The Lydian Hoard: Return to Sender, ECONOMIST,
Oct. 2, 1993, at 96, available at LExIS, Nexis Library, The Economist File (explaining
that the high cost of lawsuits often prevents the return of cultural property, espe-
cially for "countries in Central America and Africa which may be rich in art but
are poor in cash").
16 See, e.g., Sayre, supra note 15, at 857-58 (finding that cultural property laws,
which are effective in Japan, a developed or industrialized nation, are not effective
in India, a developing nation, due to unfavorable socio-economic conditions).
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1.2. Italy: An Industrialized Source Nation
Then how do we account for Italy? Italy, an industrialized na-
tion and a G-7 nation,17 continues to lose its antiquities to the illegal
antiquities market. In fact, Italy is one of the most severely affected
countries in Europe to suffer losses to the illicit antiquities trade.
18
1.3. Overview
This Comment argues that the difficulties source nations face in
protecting their cultural property has less to do with economic de-
velopment and more to do with cultural property laws and inter-
national affairs. Studying Italy, a developed nation that continues
to suffer losses of its antiquities, will dispel the notion that source
nations suffer because of their poverty.
Section 2 of this Comment will show that the root of the prob-
lem lies in the demand from end users, who drive the market, and
the failure of market nations to cooperate with source nations in
their fight against illicit trade. This Section discusses how Italy,
like other source nations, have contributed to the environment of
illicit excavation and trade through overly restrictive legal meas-
ures that do not satisfy demand. Successful resolution depends on
how a country responds to the market for its antiquities. Its re-
sponse may require resources that are more available to developed
nations than developing nations, but not necessarily so.
Section 3 examines some recent U.S. cases regarding the return
of stolen or illegally exported cultural property from U.S. defen-
dants to Italy and Turkey. Both countries have had a few successes
in repatriating their antiquities from the United States, a market
nation that has been more cooperative than others in assisting
source nations. A comparison of the two nations, Italy, a devel-
oped art-rich nation, and Turkey, a developing European nation
even richer in antiquities,19 will show that successful restitution of
17 G-7 refers to the seven largest industrialized nations in the world, which
are Italy, England, Japan, the United States, France, Germany, and Canada. Each
nation has a Finance Minister who attends G-7 meetings to discuss economic pol-
icy issues. See investorwords.com, at http://www.investorwords.com/cgi-bin
/getword.cgi?2140&G-7.
18 Fighting the Illicit Traffic of Cultural Property, at http://www.nma.gov
.au/icom/traffic.html.
19 See John Doxey, A Smuggler's Den of Antiquities, Bus..WK., Apr. 15, 1996, at
18, LExIS, Nexis Library, Business Week File ("And with more ancient Greek sites
than Greece and more Roman cities than Italy, Turkey has in recent decades sur-
passed both countries as the largest source of classical artifacts."); The Thief at the
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cultural property does not hinge on a nation's level of wealth or
state of development. Rather success turns on other issues, such as
the type of law applied in a case, the amount of evidence the plain-
tiff nation has in its favor, and the willingness of the defendant's
nation to assist in the recovery of the property.
Section 4 of this Comment outlines the efforts of the interna-
tional community and the European Union ("EU") in protecting
cultural property. It will show how the international system treats
all states equally, regardless of its stage of development and how
the solution to the problem of illicit trade is cooperation among the
states.
Finally, Section 5 draws some conclusions as to why illicit trade
of antiquities continues today and proposes solutions that do not
require a state to be industrialized to implement them. It will pre-
sent solutions based on cooperation among states and address the
demand of end users.
2. WHY ITALY AND OTHER SOURCE NATIONS SUFFER
2.1. Why Source Nations Suffer
Source nations suffer losses of its cultural property due to in-
ternational demand, which incentivizes tombaroli, smugglers, and
middlemen to act, and the unwillingness of market nations to
check the illegal flow of cultural goods.
2.1.1. The Demand for Antiquities
Second only to drugs in profitability for illegal trade,20 the in-
ternational trade in antiquities generates billions annually.21 Since
World War II, interest in antiquities among art collectors has in-
creased, leading to unprecedented growth of the antiquities mar-
Wedding, ECONOMIST, Apr. 29, 2000, LEXIS, Nexis Library, The Economist File
("Turkey is probably the largest single supplier of illicit antiquities to the West.
'Turkey has more ancient Roman towns than Italy and more antique Greek sites
than Greece .... ).
20 GREENFIELD, supra note 12, at 206.
21 Borodkin, supra note 15, at 377. Contra Ede, supra note 15, at 128 (claiming
that "Lord Renfrew['s] off-the-cuff pronouncement some years ago stating that
the trade in illicitly excavated material amounted to some L3,000,000,000 per an-
num and was second only to the trade in drugs" was "clearly nonsense, as even
he now admits").
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ket.22 Though the looting and trading of cultural property has ex-
isted for centuries,23 its extensive growth since 194524 has been a
cause of concern for many art-rich nations. The demand for antiq-
uities causes the looting of archaeological sites and the theft of state
cultural property.25 "If the demand did not exist, the practice of
clandestine archaeology would subside. If the supply of illegally
excavated objects did not exist, the black market would die."
26
2.1.2. The Failure of Market Nations to Help
An international chain of corruption 27 has emerged to facilitate
the smuggling of antiquities from where they originate and into
the hands of buyers in major market nations. The suppliers of an-
tiquities have become more sophisticated and systematic in their
operations.28 Antiquities that are smuggled out of source nations,
such as Italy and Turkey, in violation of their export regulations
move on to transit points, such as Switzerland, 29 where the lack of
22 BATOR, supra note 5, at 15.
23 Fighting the Illicit Traffic of Cultural Property, supra note 18 (stating that
the looting and trading of cultural property "was denounced in one of the oldest
legal documents in Egypt at the time of the pharaohs, in the Amherst Papyrus
dating from 1134 BC").
24 BATOR, supra note 5, at 15.
25 Fighting the Illicit Traffic of Cultural Property, supra note 18; see Rory Car-
roll, The Ransack of Italy's History, DANTE NEws ("The Italian police and the archae-
ologists agree on one point: the only sure way to defeat the tombaroli is to choke
off demand."), at http://www.dante-alighieri.org.au/Dante-News/Supplement
Stories/italyshistory.htm.
26 JOHN HENRY MERRYMAN, A Licit International Trade in Cultural Objects, in
THINKING ABOUT THE ELGIN MARBLES: CRITICAL ESSAYS ON CULTURAL PROPERTY, ART
AND LAW 176, 208 (2000) [hereinafter A Licit International Trade].
27 See Carroll, supra note 25 ("A chain of corruption ferries vases, plates and
figurines to buyers who might appreciate their beauty but who, in the process of
obtaining them, obliterate their archaeological value.").
28 See Doxey, supra note 19 (describing the role of "mafia-like" organizations).
29 Note that
Switzerland's pivotal role in the underground network that moves illic-
itly excavated artifacts from so-called source countries-nations with
rich archaeological heritages such as Italy, Turkey, Greece, among oth-
ers-to countries like Britain and the United States where the demand
and the market for art is strong, has long been acknowledged.
Gaia Regazzoni, The Beginning of the End?, ART NEWSPAPER.COM, at
http://www.theartnewspaper.com/news/article.asp?idart =9752. "Switzerland
is a well known centre of trade in antiquities, because it is situated in the middle
of Europe and because it maintains a system of free trade ports that are consid-
ered as foreign customs territory. The objects stored there are not specifically un-
Published by Penn Law: Legal Scholarship Repository, 2014
U. Pa. J. Int'l Econ. L.
import and export controls and favorable good faith purchaser
rules create the ideal environment for smuggled antiquities in tran-
sit.30 Under Swiss civil law, the owner of stolen acquisitions, who
purchased in good faith, becomes their legal owner at the end of
five years.31 Thus, once five years pass, illegally excavated antiqui-
ties of unclear provenance are safe to leave Switzerland for their
final destination in market nations like the United States, England,
Japan, or France.32
The process, which begins with the illegal export of antiquities
and ends in their legal import into market nations, makes the trade
half licit, half illicit.33 Major market nations, such as the United
Kingdom, and transit countries like Switzerland, who have yet to
change their laws or join international efforts to help source na-
tions,34 are to blame for the veneer of legality that complicates the
recovery of stolen and illegally exported cultural property. This
lack of cooperation emasculates the export controls and cultural
property laws of source nations rendering them meaningless.
The end result is that the London dealer can assure his or her
client that the antiquities in question "have been legally obtained
which may be true in the narrow sense that they have passed
through customs quite legally on their way into the country."35 In
der the control of the Swiss customs administration." Manus Brinkman, Illicit
Traffic, Fighting an Uphill Battle, 5 MDA INFORMATION, at http://www.mda.org.uk
/info5313.htm.
30 See Regazzoni, supra note 29 (referring to Switzerland's involvement in the
antiquities trade).
31 Id.
32 See BATOR, supra note 5, at 16 (describing how antiquities often find their
way to art-collecting countries such as the United States, Japan, Germany, Eng-
land, and France).
33 Polk, supra note 12.
34 Things appear to be changing. Switzerland is moving towards ratification
of the 1970 UNESCO Convention. Legislation that would implement the Conven-
tion into Swiss law has already been drafted. Notably, it increases the limitation
period on the acquisition and restitution of stolen property from five years to
thirty. See Regazzoni, supra note 29. England as well appears to be changing its
direction. In 2001, Britain declared its intention to sign the UNESCO Convention.
See Rory Carroll, Tomb Raiding's No Game, GUARDIAN UNLIMITED, at http://www
.guardian.co.uk/elsewhere/journalist/story/0,7792,474570,00. html. "'These ini-
tiatives could put a real dampener on the trade. Take out America, Britain and
Switzerland and the market is squeezed.'" Id. (quoting Neil Brodie, head of the
McDonald Institute's illicit antiquities research centre). However, none of these
gestures will mean anything until the countries sign the Convention or make real
changes to their laws.
35 Polk, supra note 12.
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turn, the "legality" of the exchange calms the troubled conscience
of the end user and guarantees that the taint of illegality will not
diminish demand or deter trade enabling the illegal trade to grow
and harm source nations.
2.2. Italy's Cultural Property Regime and Its Flaws
Under international law, the sovereign nation-state remains the
source of legal authority, making it the defender of its cultural heri-
tage.36 Italy has fulfilled this role by implementing a comprehen-
sive scheme that includes special police forces and laws regulating
the retention and return of cultural property.37 There are two po-
lice units that investigate matters in art theft and recover stolen or
illegally exported art. The Carabinieri, the Italian police, have a
special art-squad, the Comando Carabinieri Tutela Patrimonio Artis-
tico,38 and the Ministry of Finance's police force, the Guardia di Fi-
nanza, has an office that investigates art thefts and illegal excava-
tions.39
The cultural property retention scheme40 in Italy includes na-
tional ownership laws and export control regulations. Italy's na-
tional property law, Law of June 1, 1939, Regarding the Protection
of Objects of Artistic and Historic Interest, vests ownership of an-
36 See Gerstenblith, supra note 7, at 211
(It falls to the nation-state... to protect that heritage and while it has not
always been a perfect guardian of the past, it is where legal authority re-
sides and the source from which legitimate authority will come, if the
cultural heritage is to be preserved for future generations.).
37 Contra An Embarrassment of Riches, EcoNoMisT, Dec. 24,1994-Jan. 6, 1995, at
53, LEXIS, Nexis Library, The Economist File (claiming that Italy lacks a "grand
plan for conservation" of its national monuments and cultural objects, which in-
cludes the issue of illegal excavations of archaeological sites and illegal export of
antiquities).
33 See Respondents to Questionnaire Survey of Law-Enforcement Agencies
and Commercial Art Theft Databases, at http://www.object-id.com/final/07-
list.html.
39 Slayman, supra note 1, at 44.
40 JoHN HENRY MERRYMAN, The Retention of Cultural Property, in THINKING
ABOuT THE ELGIN MARBLES: CRITICAL ESSAYS ON CULTURAL PROPERTY, ART AND LAW
122, 123 (2000) [hereinafter Retention of Cultural Property] (describing retention
schemes to mean the laws nations pass to retain their cultural property within
their borders). Merryman uses the term in a critical and negative sense, but here it
will be used in a neutral sense to refer to a source nation's national cultural prop-
erty regime.
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tiquities found in the state after 1902 in the nation.41 This law, like
other source nations' national property laws, makes any illegal ex-
cavation and exportation of artifacts an act of theft.42 Declaring na-
tional ownership of antiquities originally found on Italian territory
enables Italy to reclaim stolen goods later located outside of Italy.
43
Courts of other nations honor the national property law of Italy in
deference to its state sovereignty. "Ruling otherwise would be an
unacceptable interference with the prerogative of a sovereign state
to determine its respective rights... concerning the ownership of
its cultural heritage." 44
In addition to its national property law, Italy has an export con-
trol scheme that generally forbids the export of anything that is
more than fifty years old.45 This law applies primarily to privately
held cultural property that, in the absence of export controls,
would move freely in international trade.46 In theory, Italy's export
control legislation, in tandem with the national property law, cre-
ates a national cultural property regime that retains most, if not all,
of Italy's cultural property. In practice, however, Italy's export
prohibition is not as effective as its national property law in retain-
ing and recovering cultural property.
Although the principle of state sovereignty underlies both the
national property law and export control legislation, it is detrimen-
tal in its application to export controls. "The choice of an export
policy and of a legal regime for its administration and enforcement
are matters of domestic concern, to be decided according to inter-
nal political and legal criteria."47 In the absence of treaty obliga-
41 Lawrence M. Kaye, Art Wars: The Repatriation Battle, 31 N.Y.U. J. INTL L. &
POL. 79, 92 (1998). See United States v. An Antique Platter of Gold, 184 F.3d 131,
134 (2d Cir. 1999); Andrew Slayman, Recent Cases of Repatriation of Antiquities in
Italy from the United States, 7 INT'L J. OF CULTURAL PROPERTY 456, 457 (1998).
42 See Kaye, supra note 41, at 80.
43 See United States v. McClain, 545 F.2d 988 (5th Cir. 1977) (recognizing a
state's declaration of ownership).
44 Kaye, supra note 41, at 80.
45 Sabine Gimbrre, Illicit Traffic in Cultural Property and National and Interna-
tional Law, in ILLICIT TRAFFIC IN CULTURAL PROPERTY: MusEuMs AGAINST PILLAGE 53,
56 (Harris Leyten ed., 1995).
46 See Two Ways of Thinking, supra note 13, at 67-68 (discussing the idea of re-
garding cultural property as part of a national cultural heritage).
47 JOHN HENRY MERRYMAN, The Nation and the Object, in THINKING ABOUT THE
ELGIN MARBLES: CRITICAL ESSAYS ON CULTURAL PROPERTY, ART AND LAW 158, 159
(2000) [hereinafter Nation and the Object].
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tions, nation states, because they are sovereign entities, have no ob-
ligation to enforce the export controls, i.e., the domestic policies, of
another state. In the United States, for instance, the "courts ordi-
narily will not enforce the laws of foreign states that prohibit the
export of all cultural property .... Generally, the courts have
ruled that such ordinances are functions of the purely internal 'po-
lice powers' of the foreign nation, which no other nation is bound
to enforce." 48
Additionally, Italy's export controls are ineffective because,
unlike national property laws that address legal questions of own-
ership rights, export controls attempt to regulate supply and de-
mand through legal means without taking these economic princi-
ples into consideration. Though the policy underlying export
controls extend from legal claims of national ownership, on a fun-
damental level they regulate the physical flow of goods. By not ac-
counting for the demand for antiquities, the export controls do not
provide any legal means of satisfying demand, which forces the
trade underground.49 These laws will not stop an underground
trade of antiquities until they account for the demand that keeps
the stream of goods flowing.
3. A COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF ITALY'S AND TURKEY'S SUCCESSES
IN REPATRIATING THEIR CULTURAL PROPERTY
3.1. The United States: A Market Nation's Response to Restrictive
Cultural Property Retention Schemes
Italy and Turkey have enjoyed some success in repatriating
their cultural property from the United States. In comparison to
other market nations, the United States has been a willing partner
For example, Italy, a nation whose cultural property regime might seem
to some people to be excessively retentive, is nevertheless free to persist
in that regime or to change it as it sees fit. Should an Italian collector
smuggle his Boccioni painting out of Italy in violation of the Italian cul-
tural property export control law and take it to Japan, however, the
Japanese authorities have no legal obligation to return it to Italy or to
take any other action in response to the Italian export control law.
Whether or not they do will so is for the Japanese to decide.
Id.
48 Kaye, supra note 41, at 80.
49 See Retention of Cultural Property, supra note 40, at 152; Gimbrere, supra note
45, at 53, 60; see also GREENFIELD, supra note 12, at 210 (weighing the effectiveness
of export control); Ede, supra note 15, at 130. But see Kaye, supra note 41, at 93.
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in the restitution of stolen and illegally exported cultural property.
The United States "has taken a number of measures to support the
retentive policies of source nations."50 A substantive body of law
applicable to the return of cultural property has developed,
51 in-
cluding common law principles, 52 the National Stolen Property Act
("NSPA"),5 3 and the Cultural Property Implementation Act
("CPIA").54
The NSPA prohibits the transportation in interstate or foreign
commerce of goods, valued at $5000 or more, that have been sto-
len, converted, or taken by fraud.55 In United States v. McClain,
56
where the definition of stolen property under the NSPA was at is-
sue, the court recognized the validity of national ownership laws
that vest ownership of antiquities in the nation-state. According to
the McClain doctrine, regardless of whether or not the plaintiff na-
tion ever actually had physical possession of an antiquity, the na-
tion owns it under its national ownership law.5 7 Thus, when an il-
legally excavated antiquity is imported into the United States, it is
considered a stolen good imported in violation of the NSPA.
In 1983, the United States acceded to the United Nations Edu-
cational, Scientific and Cultural Organization ("UNESCO")
Convention,5 8 implementing it through the passage of the CPIA. It
50 Retention of Cultural Property, supra note 40, at 125.
51 See Kaye, supra note 41, at 80-81 (noting the development of a body of law
favorable to the return of cultural property in the United States).
52 U.S. law operates under the common law system, where a good faith pur-
chaser cannot acquire good title from a thief. U.C.C. § 2-403(1). Thus, in cases
where an antiquity is stolen, or considered stolen because of its illegal export, the
foreign source nation may successfully reclaim it upon a showing of ownership.
For a discussion on the differences between the civil and common law systems
with regard to the position of good faith purchasers, see infra note 111.
53 18 U.S.C. § 2314 (1994).
54 Convention on Cultural Property Implementation Act, Pub. L. No. 97-446,
96 Stat. 2350 (codified as 19 U.S.C. §§ 2601-2613 (1988 & Supp. 1994)).
55 18 U.S.C. § 2314 (1994).
56 545 F.2d 988 (5th Cir. 1977).
57 See Douglas C. Ewing, Mhat is "Stolen"? The McClain Case Revisited, in THE
ETHIcS OF COLLECTING CULTURAL PROPERTY 177-78 (Phyllis Mauch Messenger ed.
1989); Gerstenblith, supra note 7, at 215 (exploring the McClain decision and its
ramifications).
58 UNESCO Convention on the Means of Prohibiting and Preventing the Il-
licit Import, Export and Transfer of Ownership of Cultural Property (Paris, 14
November 1970) List of the 95 States Parties as of 20 November 2002, at
http://www.unesco.org/culture/laws/1970/html-eng/page
3 .shtml (last visited
Dec. 4, 2002). See the discussion of the UNESCO Convention, infra Section 4.1.
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places restrictions on the import of cultural property from a nation
with which the United States has an agreement. The CPIA addi-
tionally authorizes the President to issue emergency decrees that
impose import restrictions in certain circumstances and provides
for the seizure and forfeiture of undocumented objects. 5 9
3.2. Turkey: A Developing Nation with a Restrictive Cultural
Property Retention Scheme
Turkey, "with more ancient Greek sites than Greece and more
Roman cities than Italy," 60 is a Mediterranean source nation that
suffers even more losses than Italy to the international black mar-
ket.61 An estimated $200 million in antiquities disappear yearly.62
Though the trade dates as early as the mid-19th century, the trade
exploded in the 1960s when Mafia-like organizations 63 took control
of it. Using their international connections, the Mafia-like rings sell
antiquities, smuggled through a contraband pipeline between Is-
tanbul and Germany,64 to foreign buyers.
Like Italy, Turkey has a restrictive cultural property retention
scheme. Turkey first claimed ownership of its antiquities, found in
or on its territory since 1906, through issuance of an imperial de-
cree and later through the enactment of the Law on Protection of
Cultural and Natural Antiquities in 1983.65 Its export control law,
59 See Kaye, supra note 41, at 84-85 (describing when the President may issue
such emergency decrees).
60 Doxey, supra note 19; see also The Thief at the Wedding, supra note 19 ("Tur-
key has more ancient Roman tombs than Italy and more antique Greek sites than
Greece.").
61 See BATOR, supra note 5, at 16 ("In the Mediterranean world, Turkey proba-
bly has the most severe current problem, followed by Italy ....").
62 See Doxey, supra note 19 (discussing how objects worth an estimated $200
million disappear from Turkey every year).
63 Mafia "conjures images of uneducated gangsters. But these guys are really
very cultured, and they tend to have a better eye for quality than most scholars."
Id. (quoting Sami Guneri Gulener, a former smuggler turned government infor-
mant).
64 See id. (explaining that "[m]afia style outfits sprang up in Istanbul and
Germany to mastermind the contraband pipeline").
65 See Republic of Turkey v. OKS Partners, 1994 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1732, 3
(1994) (recognizing Turkey's ownership of the antiquities at issue); Mark Rose &
Ozgen Acar, Turkey's War on the Illicit Antiquities Trade, ARCHEOLOGY, Mar.-Apr.
1995, at 46 ("[Turkey] bases its ownership of these antiquities on Turkish laws
that, since at least 1906, have established its proprietary interest in all antiquities
found in or on its territory.").
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Antiquities Law No. 1710 of 1793, bans all export of its antiquities
creating an embargo.
66
Unlike Italy, however, Turkey does not have a developed
economy or belong to the European Union ("EU").67 Rather, the
Turkish economy is in transition, and Turkey is an applicant state
to the EU.68 Turkey does not enjoy the wealth that is characteristic
of an industrialized nation or the political and legal benefits of EU
membership as Italy does. Nonetheless, Turkey has met some suc-
cess in its attempts to recover its stolen antiquities, 69 and results
have been described as impressive.70
3.3. Turkey's and Italy's Repatriation of Antiquities under U.S. Law
Italy too has successfully reclaimed several of its stolen or ille-
gally exported antiquities.71 General Roberto Conforti, head of the
Carabinieri art theft squad, has remarked that Italy's campaign for
the return of stolen works of art has begun to pay.72
In United States v. An Antique Platter of Gold,73 Italy successfully
reclaimed a fourth century B.C. gold plate (Phiale). The Phiale
passed through many hands along the way from Sicily, Italy,
through Lugano, Switzerland, to its final stop in New York City.74
Several years later, in 1995, the Italian government sought assis-
tance from the United States in investigating the Phiale's exporta-
66 See GREENFIELD, supra note 12, at 209 (stating that Turkey has total bans on
the export of antiquities).
67 See Subidey Togan, The Turkish Economy and the European Economies in Tran-
sition, in TURKEY AND CENTRAL AND EASTERN EUROPEAN COUNTRIES IN TRANSITION:
TOWARDS A MEMBERSHIP OF THE EU 7 (S. Togan and V.N. Balasubramanyam eds.,
2001) (explaining that Turkey is an applicant to the EU for membership).
68 See id. at 7-10 (stating that, unlike the EU countries, Turkey is a middle-
income, free-market economy with a relatively large public sector).
69 See Rose & Acar, supra note 65, at 45 (noting that some cases have been re-
solved in Turkey's favor).
70 See The Thief at the Wedding, supra note 19 (explaining that Turkey's aggres-
sive campaign to repatriate its heritage have had impressive results). For exam-
ple, a few years ago, Rice University in Houston, Texas, agreed to return a mosaic
medallion after it fit into a panel, which had been sent from Turkey for a "pater-
nity test." Id.
71 Slayman, supra note 41, at456.
72 Richard Owen, Rome Police Seize 'Lost' Ancient Art, FIN. TIMES, June 8, 1999,
LEXIS, Nexis Library, The Times File (London).
73 184 F.3d 131 (2d Cir. 1999) [hereinafter Antique Gold Plate case].
74 Id. at 134.
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tion and securing its return. 75 In response, the U.S. government
filed an in rem forfeiture action claiming that the Phiale had been
imported illegally due to misrepresentations on the customs forms
and Italy's ownership of the statue, which made it a stolen good
transported in violation of the NSPA.76
The district court ordered forfeiture based on the material false
statements on the customs forms, 7 and, alternatively, on the illegal
importation of stolen property in violation of the NSPA. The
statue, which the Italian state owned under its 1939 national own-
ership law,78 was considered stolen property under the McClain
doctrine79 making its importation illegal. The Second Circuit af-
firmed the first holding on the materiality of the misrepresenta-
tions on the custom forms, but did not reach the second holding on
Italy's ownership thereby avoiding the question of national owner-
ship.8 0
The outcome would have been unfavorable to Italy had there
not been several factors in its favor. First, Italy benefited from the
willingness of the U.S. government to assist in its recovery efforts
and represent the country in court. Second, the existence of the
NSPA provided Italy with a legal claim. Finally, the development
of the McClain doctrine, which considers "an object... stolen' if a
foreign nation has assumed ownership of the object through its ar-
tistic and cultural patrimony laws,"8' eased Italy's burden of estab-
lishing ownership. Italy, otherwise, would have faced the obsta-
cles of first showing ownership of the statue and then persuading a
foreign court to enforce its cultural property laws.
In The Republic of Turkey v. The Metropolitan Museum of Art,8 2 the
contested antiquities, called the Lydian Hoard, consisted of more
than 300 gold and silver artifacts, which were illegally excavated
and exported to the United States. Similar to Italy's case, Turkey
claimed ownership of the Lydian Hoard under its national prop-
75 Id.
76 991 F. Supp. 222,227 (S.D.N.Y. 1997).
77 Id. at 230.
78 See supra Section 2.2.
79 Antique Platter of Gold, 991 F. Supp. at 231-32. See Gerstenblith, supra note
7, at 246 n.88.
so Gerstenblith, supra note 7, at 246 n.88.
81 Antique Platter of Gold, 991 F. Supp. at 231. See Gerstenblith, supra note 7,
at 222-24.
82 762 F. Supp. 44 (S.D.N.Y. 1990).
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erty law. However, in contrast to the Phiale case, Turkey brought a
civil suit against the museum under New York state law for the re-
covery of chattel.83 Shortly before trial the Metropolitan Museum
returned the hoard.84
The evidence in this case determined the outcome, unlike the
Italian case, which turned on the law. Even though the court never
reached Turkey's ownership claim, the evidence that Turkey ac-
cumulated during discovery clearly indicated that the Lydian
Hoard had been taken from a Turkish tomb. Additionally, the evi-
dence showed that the Museum knew that the antiquities had been
illegally excavated and smuggled out of Turkey.85 The district
court's refusal to dismiss the case and the strong likelihood that
Turkey would win at trial motivated the Museum's return of the
Lydian Hoard.8 6 The overwhelming evidence shifted the balance
in Turkey's favor and ultimately led to the return of the Lydian
Hoard.
Both Turkey and Italy's successes prove that successful restitu-
tion of a nation's cultural property does not turn on whether the
state is developed or not, but rather on other factors. These factors
tend to be legal in nature, such as whether the source nation has
enough proof of ownership,8 7 what system of law governs, 88
whether the defendant nation is party to any agreements or con-
ventions to which the plaintiff nations belongs,8 9 and whether a
source nation legally recognizes a market nation's cultural prop-
erty laws.90 The countries in these cases were able to repatriate
their property because the evidence favored them and U.S. laws
and doctrines recognized their national property laws.
4. INTERNATIONAL CULTURAL PROPERTY REGIME
International customs and treaties constitute the two main
sources of international law.91 With respect to the international
83 Id. at 45.
84 Kaye, supra note 41, at 82.
85 Rose & Acar, supra note 65, at 47.
86 Id.
87 See supra note 82 and accompanying text.
88 See supra note 52.
89 See supra Section 3.1; infra Section 4.1.
90 See supra Section 3.1.
91 Kelly, supra note 8, at 42. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN
RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 102 (1987).
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trade in cultural property, no international customary law exists
92
and the conventions and agreements in effect only bind those par-
ties that have ratified or acceded to them.93 At present, the two
main conventions are the 1970 UNESCO Convention on the Means
of Prohibiting and Preventing the Illicit Import, Export and Trans-
fer of Ownership of Cultural Property94 and the 1995 International
Institute for the Unification of Private Law ("UNIDROIT") Con-
vention on Stolen or Illegally Exported9s Cultural Objects. Other
measures under international law include bilateral and multilateral
agreements between nation-states regarding the illicit trade in cul-
tural property and the EU measures96 regulating the movement of
cultural property within and outside the European Union.
4.1. Convention
The UNESCO Convention was intended to promote interna-
tional cooperation in the return of illegally exported cultural prop-
erty.97 However, most of the signatories are source nations leaving
the UNESCO Convention useless in cases where purchasers are lo-
cated in market nations who have not signed the agreement.
98
Other weaknesses include the Convention's limited scope of pro-
tection to only museums, public monuments, or similar institu-
tions; lack of formal dispute resolution procedures; different defi-
nitions of cultural property and different legislative adoptions of
the Convention for each state; and its applicability only to cases
92 Kelly, supra note 8, at 42.
93 Id.
94 UNESCO Convention on the Means of Prohibiting and Preventing the 11-
licit Import, Export and Transfer of Ownership of Cultural Property, Nov. 14,
1970,823 U.N.T.S. 231,10 I.L.M. 289 [hereinafter UNESCO Convention].
93 Final Act of the Diplomatic Conference for the Adoption of the Draft
UNIDROIT Convention on the International Return of Stolen or Illegally Exported
Cultural Objects, June 23, 1995, 34 I.L.M. 1322 [hereinafter UNIDROIT Conven-
tion].
96 See infra Section 4.3.
97 Etienne Clement, The UNESCO Convention on the Means of Prohibiting and
Preventing the Illicit Import, Export and Transfer of Ownership of Cultural Property
(Paris, 1970), in ILLICrr TRAFFIC IN CULTURAL PROPERTY: MUSEUMS AGAINST PILLAGE
45 (Harris Leyten ed., 1995); Kaye, supra note 41, at 84.
93 See Gimbrare, supra note 45, at 55; Kelly, supra note 8, at 44; Harrie Leyten,
Illicit Traffic and the Collections of Western Museums of Ethnography, in ILLICIT
TRAFFIc IN CULTURAL PROPERTY: MUSEUMS AGAINST PILLAGE 14, 19 (Harris Leyten
ed., 1995); Nation and the Object, supra note 47, at 173. However, this state of affairs
soon may change. See supra note 34.
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that arise after the convention has formally entered into force for
both the importing and exporting states. 99 Finally, it fails to offer
any resolution of important matters such as the position of the
good faith purchaser in restitution actions.100
In 1984, UNESCO approached UNIDROIT with a project that
would remedy the problems of the 1970 UNESCO Convention.
The result was the UNIDROIT Convention. It improves upon the
UNESCO Convention by considering subject matter that was not
considered before, such as "unlawfully excavated" cultural ob-
jects, 101 and providing for the restitution of stolen, illegally exca-
vated, or illegally exported cultural property. 102 However, the
UNIDROIT Convention so far has had few parties accede to it, and
none that could be considered important market nations.
Italy has been a party to the UNESCO Convention since 1970103
and has ratified, but not acceded to, the UNIDROIT Convention.104
Though the UNESCO Convention does not apply to all of Italy's
restitution claims, it has been quite helpful in cases between Italy
and other states that are party to the UNESCO Convention. For
example, Italy successfully recovered the Torso of Artemis from
Sotheby's New York under section 2607 of the CPIA, the United
State's legislative implementation of the UNESCO Convention.105
4.2. Bilateral Agreements
On January 19, 2001, the United States and Italy, both parties to
the UNESCO Convention, entered into a bilateral agreement in an
effort to reduce the illegal excavation of Italy's archaeological sites
and to facilitate the return of stolen antiquities.106 A few months
99 GREENFIELD, supra note 12, at 259.
100 Gimbr~re, supra note 45, at 55.
101 UNIDROIT Convention, supra note 95, at 1331.
102 Id.
103 See supra note 58.
104 International Institute for the Unification of Private Law (UNIDROIT)
Status Report, UNIDROIT Convention on Stolen or Illegally Exported Cultural
Objects, opened for signature at Rome on 24.VI.1995, at http://www.unidroit
.org/english/implement/i-95.htm.
105 Slayman, supra note 41, at 457-58. Section 2607 forbids the importation of
cultural property stolen from religious institutions of nations party to the Conven-
tion. Id. at 458.
106 Agreement between the Government of the United States of America and
the Government of the Republic of Italy Concerning the Imposition of Import Re-
strictions on Categories of Archaeological Material Representing the Pre-Classical,
Classical and Imperial Roman Periods of Italy, Jan. 19, 2001, U.S.-Italy, at
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later, an ancient bust of a victorious athlete that disappeared in
1956 from southern Italy finally returned home. "Archaeologists
welcomed the transfer as the first major success of... [the] bilat-
eral agreement between Italy and the United States to make restitu-
tion quicker and easier."
107
Bilateral agreements between nation-states, which often exist
without the auspices of a formal convention, serve as an effective
weapon against the illicit trade in antiquities. Though being party
to the UNESCO and UNIDROIT Conventions can be helpful in
dealing with other states parties, the Conventions are ineffective in
resolving disputes with nations not party to them. Since many
market nations, such as the United Kingdom and Switzerland,
have not acceded to the Conventions at this time, forming agree-
ments with market nations appear to be the best and possibly only
means to protect a source nation's cultural property under interna-
tional law.
Source nations also benefit from forming treaties with na-
tions that are not necessarily market nations, but are strategically
important in the enforcement of their cultural property laws. For
example, a treaty between Turkey and Bulgaria would greatly help
the Turkish government enforce its export restrictions. The ab-
sence of such an agreement allows for the legal export from
neighboring Bulgaria of Turkish antiquities that make it safely
across the Turkey-Bulgaria border.108 Similarly, an agreement be-
tween Switzerland and Italy would shut down one of the main
transit points for illegally exported Italian antiquities.
4.3. Regional Measures
In 1993, the formation of the EU single "market[,] ... an area
without internal frontiers in which the free movement of
goods.., is ensured,"' 09 raised concerns regarding trade in cultural
http://exchanges2.state.gov/education/culprop/it01agr.html. Article 15 of the
UNESCO Convention allows states parties to form bilateral agreements separate
from the Convention. UNESCO Convention, supra note 94, at 292. Furthermore,
the CPIA permits the United States to impose import restrictions on archaeologi-
cal and ethnological materials of party nations with which the United States signs
a bilateral or multilateral agreement. Kaye, supra note 41, at 84.
107 Carroll, supra note 34.
103 Doxey, supra note 19 ("Now, experts on both sides of the law say, some
85% of [Turkey's] booty passes through neighboring Bulgaria, several hours'
drive north form Istanbul.").
109 Council Directive 93/7,1993 O.J. (L74) 74 [hereinafter Council Directive].
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property. Italy and other source member nations worried that the
cultural objects would leave their borders more easily under the
new single market system. The Council of the European Commu-
nities, in response, passed the EC Regulation No. 3911/92 on the
export of cultural goods"O and the 1993 Directive on the Return of
Cultural Objects Unlawfully Removed from the Territory of a
Member State."'
In theory, these legal measures improved Italy's position but,
in practice, they failed to reduce the outflow of cultural property.
EC Regulation No. 3911/92 on the export of cultural goods "was
intended to establish a uniform system of control for all cultural
material exported outside the European Union, no matter what its
EU state of origin."" 2 Originally, the regulation required all antiq-
uities exported outside the EU be subject to license." 3 However,
under pressure from the English antiquities market, England, a
major market nation14 and transit point,"5 negotiated an exemp-
110 1992 O.J. (L395) 1 ("The export of cultural goods is subject to the presenta-
tion of an export licence which is valid throughout the Community. A licence
may be refused if the goods in question fall into the category of national treasures
covered by national legislation."), available at http://europa.eu.int/scadplus
/printversion/en/lvb/111017a.htm; see generally Neil Brodie, Licensing of Archaeo-
logical Material for Export, in ILLIcIT ANTIQUITIEs: THE THEFT OF CULTURE AND
EXTINCTION OF ARCHAEOLOGY 190-92 (Neil Brodie & Kathryn Walker Tubb eds.,
2002).
111 The Directive reinforces member states' national cultural property reten-
tion schemes while offering provisions that strengthen their retention efforts.
First, the Directive does not distinguish between theft and illegal export of cul-
tural property, purchased in good faith, in its prohibition of illegal removal of cul-
tural objects. This provision solves Italy's problem in enforcing its export control
laws in other jurisdictions within the EU.
Second, the Directive offers legal recourse to member states for the return of
illegally removed cultural objects found in other member states. This measure
aids Italy in recovering its illegally exported property from member states of the
civil law tradition, where the concept of bona fide allows a thief to pass good title
to a good faith purchaser after a certain period of time has passed, namely those
states in continental Europe who constitute the majority of the EU.
In contrast, in common law countries, such as England, the principle of nemo
dat qui non habet applies, which means that a seller cannot transfer a better title
than he has himself. See Patrick J. O'Keefe, Provenance and Trade in Cultural Heri-
tage, U.B.C. L. REV. 259, 263 (1995).
112 Brodie, supra note 110, at 190-91.
113 See id. at 191.
114 See Carroll, supra note 25 ("For decades, Britain, home to the second larg-
est art market in the world, has been accused of fostering the trade in stolen an-
tiquities.").
115 Brodie, supra note 110, at 186.
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tion to the licensing requirement for objects of limited archaeologi-
cal and scientific value." 6 "The exclusions negotiated at the time of
drafting the EC Regulation allow the major part of exported antiq-
uities to leave the country unlicensed.""
7
Italy's fears that a single market would facilitate the illegal
trade have come true.
The efforts of the European Union to combat the illicit trade of
cultural property illustrate the importance of cooperation amongst
nations as well as the limitations of law. The EC Directive and
Regulation established a system of export control and cultural
property restitution that worked on paper, but failed without the
cooperation of all the member states. "[I]n an integrated Europe,
Italy's export control is only as strong as that of its most liberal EU
partner, in this case the UK."11 8 Without the assistance of other na-
tions to enforce the laws, England in particular, Italy alone can
only do so much to stop the illicit trade.
5. CONCLUSIONS AND SOLUTIONS
By conceptualizing cultural property retention schemes, par-
ticularly export controls, without regard for the demand for antiq-
uities, source nations continue to promote a cultural property re-
gime that engenders a black market in antiquities." 9 Under such
regimes, tombaroli and similar groups will continue to destroy ar-
chaeological sites in search of antiquities to supply the demand.
120
In order to solve the problems source nations face in retaining
their cultural property, these nations must first recognize that de-
mand for cultural property, and so the international trade in antiq-
uities, will always exist.'2' Source nations must work to decrease
the demand for illegal antiquities at the end-point of the market.122
116 Id. at 191.
117 Id. at 198.
118 Id. at 200.
119 Retention of Cultural Property, supra note 40, at152.
120 Ede, supra note 15, at 130.
121 See GREENFIELD, supra note 12, at 153; Ede, supra note 15, at 131; Kaye, supra
note 41, at 93; JOHN HENRY MERRYMAN, The Free International Movement of Cultural
Property, in THINKING ABOUT THE ELGIN MARBLES: CRmCAL ESSAYS ON CULTURAL
PROPERTY, ART AND LAw 300,308 (2000) [hereinafter Free International Movement].
122 See Roger Bedaux, An Archaeologist's Appeal, in ILLICT TRAFFIc IN CULTURAL
PROPERTY: MuSEUMS AGAINST PILLAGE 67, 69 (Harris Leyten ed., 1995); Gersten-
blith, supra note 7, at 211; Kaye, supra note 41, at 93; Free International Movement,
supra note 121, at 308; Pronk, supra note 14, at 12.
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The end purchasers -private collectors and museums-are the
ones who create the demand that causes illicit looting and trad-
ing 23 and makes the trade so profitable.124 Controlling this de-
mand will require international cooperation as well as a truly licit
trade in some of these artifacts.
5.1. Various Solutions
Scholars and lawyers in the field of cultural property and art
law have suggested myriad solutions that address this problem. 125
These experts have championed the use of litigation and rule of
law to deter purchasers on the black market,126 while others within
the field have blamed restrictive cultural property laws for the in-
crease in illicit trade.127 Participants in the discourse on cultural
property have called for more bilateral agreements between mar-
ket nations and source nations,128 stronger national legislation,129
exchange or loan programs, 30 establishment of cultural property
schemes that distinguish between cultural patrimony and prop-
erty,13' and creation of a licit market. 32 The best solutions address
the quite real and growing demand for antiquities while using the
law to give them force.
123 Kaye, supra note 41, at 93.
124 See Slayman, supra note 1, at 43 ("[T]he choicest pieces end up on the in-
ternational market, where prices and profits are high.").
125 See generally GREENFIELD, supra note 12, at 295-316; JOHN HENRY
MERRYMAN, THINKING ABOUT THE ELGIN MARBLES: CRITICAL ESSAYS ON CULTURAL
PROPERTY, ART AND LAW (2000); Ede, supra note 15, at 131; Gerstenblith, The Public
Interest in the Restitution of Cultural Objects, 16 CONN. J. INT'L L. 197 (2001); Law-
rence M. Kaye, Art Wars: The Repatriation Battle, 31 N.Y.U. J. INT'L L. & POL. 79
(1998); Michael J. Kelly, Conflicting Trends in the Flourishing International Trade of
Art and Antiquities: Restitutio in Integrum and Possessio Animo Ferundi/Lucrandi, 14
DIcK. J. INT'L L. 31 (1995).
126 See Gerstenblith, supra note 7, at 211, 245; Kaye, supra note 41, at 93-94.
127 Retention of Cultural Property, supra note 40, at 152.
128 GREENFIELD, supra note 12, at 294; Gerstenblith, supra note 7, at 245-46;
Kaye, supra note 41, at 87.
129 GREENFIELD, supra note 12, at 294.
130 Id.
131 James Cuno, Cultural Property: The Hard Question of Repatriation Museums
and The Acquisition of Antiquities, 19 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 83, 83-84 (2001).
132 A Licit International Trade, supra note 26, at 214; Ede, supra note 15, at 130.
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5.2. The Best Solution
5.2.1. Bilateral and Multilateral Agreements
Under the current international system of sovereign nation-
states, rules and laws that regulate international trade in cultural
property are useless without the cooperation of nation-states.
Though the UNESCO and UNIDROIT Conventions are both help-
ful in theory, too few of the major market nations have signed onto
them to be of much assistance. 33 Instead, bilateral and multilateral
agreements can fill the gap. Since most market nations do not have
import restrictions on cultural property,134 these agreements will
put them in place and help source nations recover illegally ex-
ported goods. Source nations, developing or developed, can nego-
tiate these agreements to enforce controls over the export of their
cultural property and facilitate the return of stolen and illegally
exported property. Developing nations are not hindered by their
lack of wealth in forming these agreements.
135
5.2.2. A Licit Trade
Bilateral agreements will help nations recover their antiquities
and control some of the outflow, but will not solve the problem of
demand. Resolution of this problem requires source nations to re-
consider their laws and cultural property policies. Many nations
with restrictive retention schemes now are overloaded with antiq-
uities that could be sold on a licit market (generating funds for re-
covery of truly important artifacts, i.e., national treasures)136 or
loaned to museums.137
To best meet the demand from museums and private collectors
who desire ownership of the antiquities, source nations should
pass national laws limiting state ownership to antiquities that are
considered treasures essential to the nations' cultural heritage.
Surplus antiquities then should be channeled to a state-regulated
133 See supra note 34.
134 Bouwman, supra note 14, at 62.
135 The United States has such agreements with Mexico, Peru, and Guatemala
regarding the importation of pre-Columbian monumental sculpture and murals.
Two Ways of Thinking, supra note 13, at 88-89.
136 A Licit International Trade, supra note 26, at 206-07; Cuno, supra note 131, at
83-84; Ede, supra note 15, at 128.
137 A Licit International Trade, supra note 26, at 204-06.
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market 138 that rewards excavators who bring forth their finds or
identify sites loaded with artifacts. However, the sale of nonessen-
tial antiquities may not completely satisfy the private collectors'
demand for rare and valuable pieces, unlike museums that may be
content with long-term loans of national treasures. Thus, in order
to meet the demand of private collectors, source nations should
leave aside a few treasures for sale. Alternatively, reluctant source
nations could sell the treasures conditioned on their eventual re-
turn or for limited terms. For instance, under this alternative sys-
tem a private collector owns the treasure for a limited term of sev-
enty-five years or until death. Upon the end of the term or the
collector's death the treasure is returned to the source nation.
Museums should be satisfied by a policy of long-term loans of
national treasures and sales of less valuable antiquities and cultural
artifacts. The loan should be long enough for the museums to fully
study the piece, which should eliminate the museums' need to ac-
quire the artifacts for reasons other than display. In addition to
satisfying the demand of the museums, the long-term loan will
benefit source nations that may lack the resources to adequately
preserve its cultural property in the same manner as market na-
tions' museums.
6. CONCLUSION
These solutions will not completely remedy the problems of
source nations. The great demand, limits of international law, and
lack of cooperation of market nations are difficult to overcome.
However, by recognizing the demand that drives the international
black market in antiquities, they offer a realistic approach accessi-
ble to source nations both rich and poor.
138 See generally id., supra note 26.
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